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The scientific case for co-ordinated global governance of the climate system is firmly 
established, but how does this fit with a politician’s mandate as a democratically elected 
representative? What role do national politicians think they can and should play in climate 
governance? This paper tests these questions empirically, using data from interviews with 23 
Members of the UK Parliament (MPs), and a focus group of civil society advocates, conducted 
between 2016 and 2018. A global goal to limit climate change has been agreed through the 
2015 Paris Agreement. Yet while the Agreement sets a clear goal, the means to achieve it 
remain firmly at the level of the nation-state, with each country assuming responsibility for its 
own national plan. Thus national administrations, run by elected politicians, have a crucial role 
to play. This study shows that, while MPs have an understanding of the challenges posed by 
climate change and wider changes to earth systems, few have yet been able to operationalise 
this understanding into meaningful responses at the national level. The study highlights two, 
linked, reasons for this. First, politicians’ ability to act – their agency – is limited by the 
practicalities and procedures of everyday politics, and by the norms and cultures of their 
working life. Second, UK politicians feel little pressure from their electors to act on climate 
change, and have to work to justify why action on climate change carries democratic 
legitimacy. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of this research, in the 
light of the recent high-profile climate protests and declarations of a ‘climate emergency’. It 
argues that politicians, working with other stakeholders, need support in order to articulate the 
scale and significance of global climate governance, and craft responses which build 
democratic support for further action. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
It is the spring of 2018. I’m sitting in a café in the House of Commons, right 
next to the River Thames, with a newly-elected politician. I ask him what he 
thinks about climate change. “It’s terrifying”, he replies. “Where we’re sat right 
now might well be under water, right next to the Thames. I wouldn’t fancy our 
chances.” In my mind’s eye, I picture a submerged Palace of Westminster, 
and I think that he may well be doing the same. “Why isn’t that discussed 
much by politicians?” I ask. It is as if this question breaks the spell, and he 
veers away from the underwater palace, moving the discussion onto electoral 
cycles, the economy, the health service. We are back on firm ground. 
 
There is a growing body of evidence (IPCC, 2018; Rockström et al., 2009a) 
that human activity has influenced Earth’s planetary systems to such an extent 
that the planet is entering a new and different geological era, the 
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Anthropocene (Biermann et al., 2012a). One of the most significant impacts is 
the change to the planet’s climate system brought about by anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2018). Whereas earth’s climate had a 
long and turbulent history before the arrival of our species, the past 11700 
years, the Holocene era, has been remarkably stable. During this period, 
complex human societies have developed, with the advent of agriculture, large 
settlements, and more recently, nation-states, democratic government, 
industrialisation and globalised economic systems. As the planet moves out of 
the stable climate of the Holocene, into an era characterised by greater 
instability, the implications for human society are both profound and uncertain 
(Rockström et.al., 2009b).  
 
Better understanding of these changes has led to calls for governance of earth 
systems: purposeful, co-ordinated action by humans, aiming to limit changes 
to the climate and other earth systems, to allow human societies to continue 
and flourish. Prominent among these are the calls for ‘planetary stewardship’, 
which advocates a system of governance “built around scientifically developed 
boundaries for critical Earth System processes” (Steffen et al,2011:757) and 
the Earth System Governance project, which calls for an expanded role for the 
United Nations organisations, to strengthen action at multilateral level, set 
global standards, and co-ordinate national action (Biermann et al., 2012b). 
 
The research presented here investigates how one particular influential group, 
national politicians, understand and respond to this challenge. What role do 
national politicians think they can play in the governance of the climate? I 
begin with a discussion and critique of the way in which scientific researchers, 
and others, have advocated for global governance of earth systems. Following 
a description of the methodological stance, I present empirical data from a 
focus group of civil society advocates, and interviews with 23 Members of the 
UK Parliament (MPs) to examine the question of how national politicians 
respond to climate change. Finally, I discuss the implications of this evidence, 
in the light of recent high-profile protests and political declarations on climate 
change. I conclude that researchers and practitioners alike must focus 
attention on building a political case for climate action within countries and 
local areas, rather than assuming that politicians will act because scientific 
evidence shows that such action is necessary. 
 
2. The case for global governance of the climate system 
 
Over the past decade, there have been increasingly urgent calls from the 
scientific and research community for a co-ordinated process of global 
governance, to limit anthropogenic interference with earth systems, 
particularly the climate system. Below, I discuss an example of such an 
approach – the framework of ‘Earth System Governance’. I argue that such 
initiatives would be strengthened if more attention was paid to questions of 
political agency, and to the need to develop democratic legitimacy. This is 
illustrated through discussion of climate politics in the UK, a country often 
seen as a leader, though recent policy implementation has stalled.  
 
2.2 Earth System Governance  
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Earth System Governance is defined by one of its architects, Frank Biermann, 
as “the societal steering of human activities with regard to the long-term 
stability of geobiophysical systems” (2014a:59). Governance is understood as 
the process by which humans try to manage their impacts on earth systems, 
in order to ensure continued benign conditions for human societies. Much 
work in this area has been carried out through the Earth System Governance 
project, launched in 2009 under the auspices of the International Human 
Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change, and now part of 
the Future Earth initiative (Future Earth, 2018). 
 
Biermann stresses that Earth System Governance has both an analytical and 
normative dimension. It is an analytical project, studying “the emerging 
phenomenon of Earth System Governance as it is expressed in hundreds of 
international regimes, international bureaucracies, national agencies, local 
and transnational activist groups, expert networks, etc” (2014:59). It is 
normative, in that it proposes ways in which governance processes could be 
reformed, to better manage earth systems. For example, over thirty scholars 
from the Earth Systems Governance project co-authored a paper in the lead-
up to the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 
putting forward nine areas in which, they argued, major governance reforms 
were needed. The paper concluded that  
 
Swift transformative structural change in global governance is needed. 
We need a ‘constitutional moment’ in the history of world politics, akin 
to the major transformative shift in governance after 1945 that led to the 
establishment of the United Nations… Earth system transformation 
calls for similar, if not even more fundamental, transformations in the 
way societies govern their affairs. (Biermann et al., 2012b:57) 
 
Similarly, the 2012 Planet Under Pressure conference, a gathering of over 
3000 stakeholders including representatives from academia, business, media 
and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), resulted in a “State Of The 
Planet Declaration”: 
 
Fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and 
international institutions is required to overcome barriers to progress 
and to move to effective Earth-system governance. (Brito and Stafford-
Smith, 2012) 
 
Whilst much research on Earth System Governance has focussed on 
multilateral institutions, there is also analysis of state and non-state actors, 
including national and local government, NGOs, business stakeholders and 
citizens; and an assertion that governance is multi-layered and polycentric 
(Biermann 2014b; Bernstein and Hoffmann, 2018; Kuyper et al., 2018).  
 
2.3 Political agency 
 
Advocates for global governance of earth systems tend to underplay issues of 
political agency: who has both the power, and the motivation, to bring about 
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fundamental change? For example, summarising his call for improved Earth 
System Governance, Biermann, while acknowledging the role of non-state 
actors and national governance, states that  
Effective international cooperation must be a basis for Earth System 
Governance in the Anthropocene. A concerted effort is needed to bring 
these institutions in line with the exigencies of the changed political 
context of Earth System transformation. (2014a:60) 
 
The reasoning behind this statement is clear. Earth systems must be 
managed through international co-operation. However, such statements 
radically underplay the question of political agency. Who has responsibility, 
and power, to act? The phrase “a concerted effort is needed” is written in the 
passive voice, without indicating who is making the effort, on whose behalf. 
Similarly, the Planet Under Pressure declaration states that “fundamental 
reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions is 
required” (Brito and Stafford-Smith, 2012:8),  without stating who requires it, 
and who will bring it about.  
 
There is an assumption that it is possible for actors – including multilateral 
institutions, national governments and other interests including social 
movements - to translate scientific evidence into appropriate, agreed 
responses. Maarten Hajer coins the phrase ‘cockpitism’ to describe the illusion 
that governance of earth systems can be managed in this way, by committed 
actors – pilots, in this analogy – assessing all the evidence at their disposal, 
and having the freedom to respond accordingly in order to steer the planet, as 
aeroplane, into a safe landing (Hajer et al., 2015).  
 
Yet, in stark contrast to the cockpit analogy, the question of who the actors are, 
and what agency they have, is complex and contested. As has long been 
argued by scholars of science and technology studies, it is not simply a case 
of ‘translating’ evidence into action. Reactions to scientific evidence are 
complex and situated, influenced by social and institutional norms and 
cultures (Demeritt, 2001; McNeil, 2013; Wynne, 2010).   
 
It is not that there is no discussion of agency within this research field. Much 
has been written about the role of different institutions in driving change, 
including, for example, Biermann’s (2014b) survey of those individuals, 
organisations and networks participating in decision-making; Oran Young’s 
(2017) work on networks and social capital;  John Dryzek and Haley 
Stevenson’s (2011) work advocating a more deliberative democratic approach 
to global environmental governance, and many political theoretical accounts of 
politics in the Anthropocene (for example, (Eckersley, 2017; Purdy, 2015; 
Wapner, 2014).  
 
A missing perspective in these studies, however, is an understanding of how 
politicians and other decision-makers understand their role, and the extent to 
which they feel themselves to be protagonists in this debate. Why would a 
politician, civil servant or other decision-maker decide to expend time, energy 




Put another way, it is widely known that anthropogenic climate change poses 
a grave threat to human society. Why, then, are politicians and other senior 
decision-makers not prioritising this issue in all their statements and actions? 
To date, there have been few attempts to answer these questions, as 
highlighted in a review by Lauren Rickards and colleagues (2014) into the role 
of senior decision-makers in climate action.  
 
This first limitation of much research into global climate governance links to a 
second limitation: the question of democratic legitimacy. The ability, and 
willingness, of national legislators to respond to demands for climate 
governance depends on the political conditions within which decisions are 
made. This, in turn, depends on whether politicians feel that they have a 
mandate, from their electorate and others.  
 
2.4 Democratic legitimacy 
 
Advocates of global governance to regulate the climate and other earth 
systems are rarely explicit about how calls for reform relate to democratic 
processes at the local, national or international level. Such calls are often 
presented as a precondition of human society, something that must be done, 
given the weight of scientific evidence. The question of how reforms can be 
brought about, democratically or otherwise, is not specified.  
 
Andrew Dobson describes this approach, stating what ‘must’ be done without 
specifying how, as attempting to play “a card that will trump political debate 
and discussion” (2010:765). Yet to the extent that action relies on legislation 
or policy change, politicians need to steer reforms through formal political 
processes. Put bluntly, what if calls for governance of earth systems do not 
garner democratic support? How should a politician respond if scientists call 
for urgent action, but publics, including those whose votes they depend upon, 
do not prioritise the issue? In this situation, politicians are left with the tricky 
job of crafting a case for action, on an issue that is not front-of-mind for voters 
(author, 2018). 
 
This paper does not argue against recommendations for strengthened, 
multilateral governance. Rather, the analysis suggests that more emphasis 
must be placed on the processes by which such governance could be brought 
about, and how reforms can be steered through national political systems, in 
ways that engage electorates and develop a mandate for further action. In 
other words, researchers must address the ‘politics gap’ identified by Ian 
Bailey and Piers Revill (2015). Below, these issues are discussed with 
reference to a specific example: the case of climate governance, and its 
implementation in the United Kingdom.  
 
2.4 The case of climate change in the UK  
 
The Paris Climate Agreement of 2015 can be seen as a step toward global 
governance of the climate, in that 195 countries reached agreement, following 
previous failed attempts, notably at Copenhagen in 2009. The agreement 
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declared that ‘climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible 
threat to human societies and the planet… deep reductions in global 
emissions will be required’ (UNFCC, 2015:1).  A goal was set to limit global 
average temperature rise to between 1.5°C and 2°C.  
 
However, the Agreement also highlighted the limitations of governance 
through international consensus. Whilst a global goal was agreed, there were 
no legally-binding commitments or targets agreed for individual states. Each 
state instead assumed responsibility for developing its own plan, or ‘nationally 
determined contribution’ (NDC). The Paris framework offers each state the 
opportunity to shape their own response, to fit national circumstances and 
democratic possibilities. Yet so far, the sum total of all actions pledged 
through NDCs does not match the Paris ambition of holding global 
temperatures below 2°C, with analysis of current NDCs showing that, even if 
they are implemented in full, the ambition will not be met (Fawcett et al., 2015). 
As a result, the agreement has been criticised as too weak (Allen 2019). 
 
The UK is in a relatively strong position to respond to the Paris Agreement. It 
has statutory targets on carbon reduction, enshrined in the 2008 Climate 
Change Act, passed with cross-party political support, and amended in 2019 
to set a target of net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050. [ref]  
 
However, the means by which this goal will be reached are not clear. Targets 
need to be met through policies and action to reduce emissions in energy, 
transport, buildings and land use, for example. The Committee on Climate 
Change, established as an independent adviser under the Climate Change 
Act, has repeatedly has criticised government for a so-called ‘policy gap’ 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2017;2019) saying that further policies are 
required if targets are to be met. However, in the decade following the 
introduction of the Act, neither of the two main political parties in the UK has 
paid much attention to the issue, and there were fears cross-party consensus 
may be eroding (Carter and Clements, 2015; Farstad et al., 2018).  
 
In short, despite a comprehensive international agreement, and a strong 
legislative framework for domestic action, the period from 2008-2018 was 
marked by limited political activity on, or commitment to, climate issues in the 
UK, and underachievement against targets set.  
 
In recent months, activist pressure on climate change, particularly the school 
strikes, the global climate strike of 20 September 2019 attended by an 
estimated 4 million people worldwide, and the new protest movement 
Extinction Rebellion, has contributed to growing public awareness and 
concern (Barasi, 2019). Politicians have replied with strong articulations of the 
climate challenge. More than 200 local governments, along with the Scottish, 
Welsh and United Kingdom parliaments, have declared a ‘climate emergency’, 
with some introducing very ambitious targets, such as net-zero greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2030 (Climate Emergency UK 2019). It is not clear yet how 
this will translate into government policy or strategy. I will discuss possible 
outcomes in the concluding section.  
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Both the ‘silent decade’ of 2008-18, and the recent strong statements in 
support of climate action, show that responses to climate change must be 
understood in the context of the complexities of national politics. The study 
described below uses data from a study of UK politicians, to investigate this 
question.  
 
3. Method  
 
3.1 Methodological orientation  
 
This study aims to supplement macro, structural descriptions of governance, 
with a more fine-grained, contextual account of the ways in which national 
politicians experience the issue of climate change, as one of a number of 
Earth System challenges. To do this, the study takes a mixed-method 
approach, inspired by what Sanford Schram (2013) calls “phronetic social 
science”.  
 
The term ‘phronesis’ refers to an Aristotelian categorisation of knowledge, 
described as “the practical wisdom that emerged from having an intimate 
familiarity of what would work in particular settings and circumstances” 
(Schram 2013:369). As such, it can be distinguished from episteme, or 
universal knowledge; and technē, or practical application of knowledge. 
Following this approach, this study aims to uncover politicians’ phronetic 
knowledge. It scrutinises their understandings of the possibilities and 
constraints of their role, or what Schram et al refer to as “‘unconsciously 
competent’ expertise” (2013:371).  
 
Phronetic social science can be used to illuminate and problematise the 
workings of power within political and governmental settings. For example, 
Steven Griggs and David Howarth (2012) use the approach to examine the 
concept of ‘sustainable aviation’ in UK government policy. They argue that 
consultation processes presented as consensus-building exercises conceal 
fundamental value-conflicts between different actors, in this case, the 
government, the aviation industry and campaign groups. Thus, in the words of 
Bent Flyvbjerg,  
 
In phronetic social science, ‘applied’ means thinking about practice and 
action with a point of departure not in top-down, decontextualized 
theory and rules, but in ‘bottom-up’ contextual and action-oriented 
knowledge, teased out from the context and actions under study by 
asking and answering the value-rational questions that stand at the 
core of phronetic social science. What is applied is not a theory, but a 
philosophy of engagement. (2012:286) 
 
A phronetic approach, then, aims to uncover the assumptions, motivations 
and expertise of particular actors, in order to develop a contextual 
understanding of a given issue, in which questions of power and agency are at 
the centre of the analysis. Following this approach, the study presented here 
seeks to analyse climate governance, not as a top-down, idealised concept, 
 8 
but as a set of working practices enacted by individual actors – in this case, 
Members of the UK Parliament. 
 
3.2 Research process  
 
This paper reports on two datasets: first, a focus group discussion with 
representatives from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who work 
closely with politicians, and second, 23 narrative interviews with current and 
former MPs. Each of these stages is outlined below.  
 
Prior to the interviews with politicians, a focus group was held, comprising 
representatives from NGOs, six individuals who work directly with MPs on 
climate change. The discussion was hosted by the think-tank Green Alliance, 
in February 2016. Representatives from Christian Aid, Green Alliance, the 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the World Wildlife Fund UK and 
Greenpeace took part. Comments made were non-attributable. I asked them 
about their experiences of working with politicians on climate change, and 
their views on what motivates politicians. The discussion was recorded, 
transcribed and coded using nVivo software. 
 
I then interviewed 23 current and former MPs, between February 2016 and 
April 2018. Participants were selected to provide a balance of age, gender, 
political party, seniority and length of time served as an MP, as well as 
previous experience working on climate issues (see table). Known ‘climate 
sceptic’ MPs (defined as those who publicly state that they do not accept the 
scientific consensus, as represented by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC)) were not approached. This is because the research 
investigates how MPs try to understand and act on climate change, rather 
than examining the reasons for rejecting the issue altogether. Although this is 
an important question, a different research strategy would be needed for this 
group. Though climate sceptics are influential, they are small in number, with 
only five MPs out of 659 voting against the Climate Change Act in 2008. 
 
Interviews were conducted under conditions of anonymity, following a written 
ethics protocol, and were recorded, transcribed and coded. Riessman’s (2008) 
narrative method was used, focussing on eliciting narrative, with the interview 
conducted as a free-flowing conversation. As Todd Landman notes, “narrative 
analysis can illuminate the ways in which individuals experience, confront and 
exercise power” (2012:28), and so is particularly suited to phronetic social 
science. 
 
The interviews were designed to investigate politicians’ accounts of how they 
navigate their working life, and within this, whether or how they consider the 
issue of climate change. I asked interviewees how they responded to the 
scientific consensus on climate change, as established by the IPCC. I then 
asked them to reflect on the ways in which the issue of climate change was 
understood, shaped and acted on in political life. 
 
Table 1: Interviewees’ background and experience  
gender 14 male, 9 female (gender balance of current Parliament is 
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71% male) 
party affiliation 8 Conservative, 9 Labour, 4 Liberal Democrat, 2 other 
time served as MP Between 1 and 23 years’ work as an MP; mean = 8.6 
years 
current status 12 sitting MPs; 11 former MPs, who left office between 
2010 and 2017 
seniority 9 interviewees had served in government; 4 had served on 
the opposition frontbench. 10 were backbenchers, most 
with experience on Select Committees. 
record on climate 
change issues 
7 with a strong record of activity on climate change issues 
(assessed through speeches in Westminster and 
elsewhere); 11 with some activity; 5 with little or no activity 
participants were not asked for additional demographic data, e.g. age or ethnicity 
 
4. Results  
 
The combined methods used in this study reveal a consistent picture of the 
way in which politicians respond to climate change. Whilst there were some 
differences between political parties (see Carter, 2013 for a discussion of the 
positions of the main UK parties), these differences were not marked; instead, 
a consistent pattern emerged, reinforced by the focus group data.  
 
The pattern can be summarised as follows. Most politicians accept the 
science of climate change, and do not question the scientific consensus 
established by the IPCC. (Note that as detailed above, the small number of 
known ‘climate sceptic’ MPs were not interviewed for this study). However, 
whilst politicians accepted the science, they downplayed the consequences. 
Most also show a reluctance to discuss the far-reaching implications of climate 
change for human society, or more radical proposals for mitigation. Questions 
of agency and democratic legitimacy, discussed above, conditioned their 
understanding, and their conception of plausible responses to climate change.  
 
Below, evidence for politicians’ understanding of the science of climate 
change is first reviewed. Then the themes of agency and democratic 
legitimacy are explored. 
 
4.1 Accepting the science, downplaying the consequences 
 
Politicians generally accepted and acknowledged the scientific consensus, as 
represented by the IPCC. However, this acceptance was coupled with a 
notable reluctance to open up discussion on the material significance of 
climate change. In each interview, politicians were prompted to consider the 
significance of climate change. As the interviewer, I noted the scientific 
consensus, as reflected by the IPCC, and stressed the implications of this, by 
saying, for example,  
We’ve had a stable climate for twelve thousand years; we risk not 
having a stable climate any more. In those twelve thousand years, 
that’s when we’ve done everything from agriculture onwards. Human 
society as we know it has been formed in those twelve thousand years. 
The shift we’re talking about is really profound. Do you think that 
politicians, or society more widely, have taken that on board? 
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This question was asked in each of the 23 interviews, with the approach 
varying slightly depending on the background of the interviewee. The 
response to this was acceptance and acknowledgement. Most interviewees 
nodded and murmured agreement. Eight expressed strong fear or concern, 
saying, for example, “it’s terrifying”, or “it’s the greatest challenge facing the 
planet”. The findings suggest that politicians have a broad understanding of 
the scientific consensus, and see it as a problem that needs attention, with a 
significant minority acknowledging the profound nature of the problem.  
 
However, despite this acceptance of the evidence, the interviews revealed a 
striking reluctance to open up discussion on the significance of climate change.  
Despite acknowledgement of the problem, no interviewee offered further 
comments or questions about the science of climate change, or its impacts. All 
interviewees found ways to move the discussion on to other topics. One 
former MP said that, during his time in Parliament, he had never heard the 
issue ‘strongly articulated’: 
 
Even those of us who I strongly advocated action, I don’t think we, I’m 
trying to think back to a time when it was ever really strongly articulated 
like that… it’s almost like they don’t want to think about that. I’d say 
that’s even true of people who think we need to grip it, it’s like it’s such 
a frightening thought that it’s easier to just assume and believe, be 
optimistic. 
 
Instead of continuing discussion of the significance of climate change for 
human society, interviewees steered the discussion on to other linked areas, 
such as parliamentary procedure, public opinion, or technical policy solutions. 
My field notes reveal what I perceived as a “social awkwardness” that 
emerged if I continued to press this line of questioning: 
 
I find it difficult to ask these questions… I feel confrontational, as if I am 
breaking the rules of what can be talked about [extract from fieldnotes]. 
 
MPs’ responses to climate change therefore combined an acceptance of the 
issue, coupled with a reluctance to open up discussion on its implications. The 
sociologist Kari Norgaard labels this ‘socially organised denial’, which she 
defines as “not in most cases a rejection of information per se, but the failure 
to integrate this knowledge into everyday life or to transform it into social 
action” (2011:11). Researchers of the climate science community have found 
similar responses among scientists, who tend to downplay the implications of 
their findings (Brysse et al., 2013; Head and Harada, 2017).  
 
Part of the reason for this, for MPs, may lie in the difficulties of developing a 
full understanding of the implications of climate change. One veteran politician 
explained this by distinguishing between ‘agreement’ and ‘understanding’, as 
this exchange shows: 
 
Interviewer: The science is pretty settled, most politicians agree with 
that scientific consensus. 
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Interviewee: Sorry, I need to qualify that. Agree without understanding. 
It’s become the politically correct thing to do… but do they understand 
what it means? 
 
In the NGO focus group, consisting of individuals who work directly with 
politicians, participants argued that understanding, as distinct from agreement, 
developed only when politicians were appointed into a relevant role, as a 
junior minister or spokesperson for energy or climate change, for example: 
 
Most politicians will have a sort of sense, when they’re appointed into a 
role, broadly what the issues are, but I think the reason that the 
commitment grows is that they get the data, they get the evidence, they 
see what’s going on, and go, bloody hell, this is going to be disastrous. 
 
Another NGO representative described how politicians undergo a gradual 
realisation when they acknowledge that climate change is not another issue to 
add to the list, but something that affects the foundations of our society: 
 
I suspect that for most politicians, just routinely experiencing the media, 
then they would hear environment and climate change in no particularly 
separate box from health, education and transport, the business world, 
Europe: it’s just one of a range of issues that are political and of the day, 
and something needs to be done. And actually when they go into it, and 
have to start getting their head round it, they realise that this is this big 
massive transformative thing that could happen. 
 
Taken together, interviews with MPs and focus group evidence therefore 
shows that politicians may refrain from discussing the profound, long-term 
implications of climate change for human society, in part because of this gap 
between ‘awareness’ and ‘understanding’. In the words of the focus group 
participant above, they do not conceptualise climate change as a “massive 




As outlined above, while interviewees accepted the science of climate change, 
they tended to downplay its implications. They were reluctant to discuss more 
radical solutions, such as the proposals put forward by Earth System 
Governance advocates. This can be explained only in part by a lack of 
understanding of the evidence. Data from this study shows that responses are 
conditioned by politicians’ understanding of agency: their own agency, and the 
wider ability of institutions and states to respond in full. From the vantage point 
of the national politician – even the most committed, fearless politician – the 
agency of individual politicians, and governments, is limited. To put it in the 
earthy language of one veteran ex-minister interviewed, “motivation isn’t just a 
set of beliefs, it’s about an ability to implement… it’s all very worthy, but what 
the fuck can you do?” 
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Limitations to agency are both practical – what is achievable within the 
framework of current laws and procedures – and also cultural: how politicians 
understand social and cultural norms. These are discussed in turn below. 
 
Most interviewees highlighted practical and procedural difficulties in 
responding to climate change. In particular, they drew attention to the lack of 
‘fit’ between large-scale, earth-system challenges, and the daily practice of 
politics. Bluntly, politicians are realistic about the extent of their power. This is 
partly a function of the UK system, in which the Government has almost 
exclusive power to initiate legislation, leaving backbench and opposition MPs 
relatively powerless, with roles largely as influencers or protesters, as more 
than half the interview sample pointed out.1 However the limitations of the 
government’s power are also front-of-mind for politicians. As one said,  
 
The punters, the populace think that the politicians, the prime minister 
for example, is all-powerful. Actually, they absolutely are not. I’m not 
saying they have no power, but they can’t just do it. 
 
Politicians also identified less tangible but nonetheless very significant 
constraints on agency. Interviews revealed the ways in which MPs’ responses 
to climate change were conditioned by social and cultural norms, and 
institutional practices. Specifically, those who speak out on climate change 
were regarded by their colleagues as outsiders, not part of the political 
mainstream. I asked one MP, who was in Parliament when the 2008 Climate 
Change Act was passed, whether it was discussed much. She replied, “a little 
bit, not very much. It was seen as something by the obsessives”. A former MP, 
who had campaigned actively on climate change and environmental issues, 
said “I was known as being a freak”.  
 
Whilst all interviewees reported that there was a small minority of MPs who 
champion climate issues, they also pointed to a more widely-shared 
reluctance to engage, particularly from elements of the Conservative party, but 
also reported across party lines. One explained it as follows: 
 
There’s a kind of obdurate hostility which is culturally quite difficult. And 
just as there’s a kind of cross-party group and an understanding, who 
see the science, recognise intellectually, there’s a huge group that does 
not, that sees it as peripheral, wet, liberal, lefty, interfering, non-
business. 
 
Another interviewee noted that climate change issues were rarely raised in 
debates about the economy. When asked what would happen if he talked 
about climate change in a debate on the Budget, he replied,  
 
                                            
1 The Parliamentary role on Brexit issues has proven an exception to these 
practices, with Parliament asserting its power over successive governments 
with weak or non-existent majorities from 2016 onwards. It is unclear whether 
this will lead to lasting changes in the relationship between parliament and 
government in the UK. 
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They’d just think you were a bit ‘niche’, is the way I’d put it. I say ‘niche’ 
in quotes like a bit of a lunatic fringe.  
 
NGO representatives described the same phenomenon. They reported that 
climate change was not seen as an issue that an ambitious MP would 
champion. One described how it might look to a government minister wanting 
to develop their personal power and influence: 
 
If you’re [a cabinet minister] and you broadly think that climate change 
is happening and you should do something about it, you walk into 
cabinet and you start saying right guys what are we going to do about 
climate change, you’ll just get laughed out of the room, because they 
want to be talking about the economy, and building stuff, and bombing 
people. It’s just not a serious sort of cabinet issue for the big bruisers. 
[If] you’re trying to build your base in a party, you absolutely don’t do 
that by talking about airy fairy climate change. You do that by talking 
about jobs and the economy. 
 
As a result, whilst a minority of MPs were vocal and insistent in their support 
of climate change action, most reported that they felt the need to self-censor: 
to restrict the amount that they talk about climate change, or modify the 
language they use. (This is discussed in more detail in a separate paper, 
Willis, 2017). For example, one reported that she felt she would get a better 
outcome from discussions if she didn’t appear to be “a climate change zealot”. 
When arguing for a sustainable transport scheme in her constituency, she 
chose to make her case on economic and social grounds, without mentioning 
carbon reduction: 
 
I think if I had mentioned carbon emissions, I would have been, there 
would have been a rolling of eyes and saying, oh here he goes again. 
 
These findings are consistent with previous research on politicians, which 
show that MPs’ outlooks and actions are influenced by institutional and 
cultural contexts. For example, studies on gender in the House of Commons 
(Lovenduski, 2012; Malley, 2012; McKay, 2011; Puwar, 2004) demonstrate 
that the norms and rituals of parliament condition and constrain action. New 
institutionalist thinkers refer to this as a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Chappell, 
2006:223). Institutions like Parliament should be seen, they argue, as 
‘collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions’ 
(Chappell, 2006:161; see also Douglas, 1986; Lewis and Steinmo, 2012). In 
short, the agency of individual politicians is constrained not just by law and 
procedure, but by social and cultural norms. 
 
These norms can also be seen amongst the wider political community, 
including representatives from NGOs and advisory groups. One MP, a veteran 
climate campaigner, criticised those outside parliament for crafting messages 
to appear credible and reasonable to politicians: 
 
…people coming in, basically telling MPs what they want to hear... It 
made me so angry.  
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This interviewee vividly described how experts, when talking to MPs, “don’t 
want to sound like an outlier… it’s something about this place, I think, once 
you get inside one of those Committee rooms.”  
 
NGO representatives also reported how they crafted messages that they 
believed would resonate and appeal to politicians. One focus group participant 
described the NGOs’ attempts to present climate action as an economically 
beneficial strategy, comparing their messages to that of corporate 
consultancies: 
 
I think the environment community, we’ve chased ourselves round to 
pretend that we’re McKinsey and EY, and it’s been really helpful in 
winning the overall argument, shifting how climate change is perceived. 
 
Political scientists refer to this process of crafting messages as ‘framing’, in 
which politicians and other political actors, consciously or not, shape an issue 
to fit with dominant ideologies, a sense of what is achievable, prevailing norms 
and assumptions and so on (Benford and Snow, 2000; Cobb and Coughlin, 
1998; Kingdon, 1995).  
 
Thus the evidence presented here shows a tendency to focus on immediate, 
technical solutions, rather than considering the full implications of climate 
change for politics and society. Politicians and those who interact with them 
seek ways of addressing climate change which fit with the working practices of 
Parliament and the institutions of policymaking. Interviewees were eager to 
give examples of possible approaches, such as incentivising renewable 
energy, and promoting public transport.  
 
This reluctance to linger on the ‘big problem’ of climate change, and a move 
instead to ‘little solutions’, seemed to be a result of politicians’ understanding 
of their agency, or room for manoeuvre. They would prefer to propose 
practical solutions which fit with social, cultural and institutional norms. Yet it 
leads to questions about whether such solutions add up to a sufficient 
response to the problem. It certainly precludes discussion of the arguments 
put forward by more radical critics (eg Jackson, 2011; Klein, 2015) that climate 
change requires a fundamental rethink of economy and society. 
 
4.3 Democratic legitimacy 
 
Politicians’ responses to climate change were also conditioned by their 
understandings of their representative role. The relationship between an 
elected politician and those that they represent is complex, and the subject of 
much debate in political theory (for a summary see Dobson and Hamilton, 
2016; Mansbridge, 2003). Recent work by Michael Saward argues that 
representation should be seen not as a static fact, but as a dynamic exchange 
between representatives and those being represented, in which a politician (or 
anyone else seeking a representative role) can make a ‘representative claim’, 
which in turn is accepted or rejected by others: 
 
 15 
Political representation is not simply a fact of political life, or an 
achieved state of affairs, resulting from elections. Rather, at a deeper 
level, representation is a dynamic process of claim-making and the 
reception of claims. (Saward, 2010:8)  
 
Data from this study fits with Saward’s conception of representation as claim-
making. MPs reported consistently that they felt little or no pressure from most 
people they saw themselves as representing, to work on climate issues (note 
that interviews were conducted before the climate protests of 2019). Thus, if 
they saw the need to act on the issue, they worked to construct a claim, 
demonstrating how their stance on climate change could be justified in terms 
of their role as an elected politician. 
 
Evidence for the lack of pressure to act on climate change was strong. Typical 
comments included 
 
I’ve knocked hundreds, literally thousands of doors, and had tens of 
thousands of conversations with voters… and I just don’t have 
conversations about climate change. 
 
When you go around with your clipboard asking what are your top 
priorities, you always know it’s health, economy, education, crime, stuff 
like that, and environment always comes very [low] down. 
 
Though all interviewees reported that vocal support for climate action was low, 
they did describe a minority who, though small in number, were vocal about 
the need for climate action. One interviewee described this group as 
“articulate, affluent people who have perhaps a particular type of worldview”. 
Another described climate change as one of a number of concerns including 
development and peace issues, which he labelled “the concerns of that type of 
person, who were committed activists and great people, but were not 
representative, at all, at all.” 
 
Others, however, persisted, despite the difficulties. Interviewees discussed the 
ways in which it was possible to address the issue, through developing an 
account of how a certain course of action would serve the interests of they 
claim to represent: in Saward’s terms, developing a ‘representative claim’. A 
separate paper (Willis, 2018) offers further details of this claims-making 
process.  
 
Four types of claim can be seen. First, some MPs made a cosmopolitan claim, 
saying that it is in the interests of the human species as a whole to act, and 
therefore it should be a concern for all politicians.  
 
I often started off with that sort of fairly internationalist viewpoint… a lot 
of the impacts of climate change are going to hit other places before 
they hit here. [My constituency] is not likely to be one of the first places 
to be hit particularly badly. So what? I just happen to be here. 
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Second, some framed the issue as a local prevention claim, asserting that 
action is necessary to prevent impacts such as flooding in their local area.  
 
I talk for example quite a bit about… domestic flood risk. I don’t see it 
as one of the biggest consequences of climate change, in reality, but 
“your house is going to flood if we keep doing this and you will not be 
able to get insurance for it, so we need to do something about it”… is a 
powerful message. 
 
Third, many pointed to the economic or social benefits arising from taking 
action on climate change, such as jobs created in renewable energy industries. 
This can be called a co-benefits claim, as politicians are claiming that such 
action helps toward tackling climate change, as well as bringing other specific 
local benefits.  
 
In [my area], the green economy, the offshore wind, presents an 
opportunity. 
 
I’m happy to use an economic argument if that means that more people 
will come on side… I change the language to be much, much less 
extreme. 
 
Last, a significant minority of interviewees judged that they could not speak 
out on climate, because a direct claim would be opposed or ignored. Instead, 
they make what might be called a surrogate claim, in which climate change is 
not explicitly mentioned. Instead, other reasons are given for measures which 
the politician privately believes will help to tackle climate change. 
 
I would rather not say a word about climate change and stop the [local 
road] being ten lanes, than make a really good case about climate 
change and have a ten lane bloody superhighway next to us. 
 
As these examples show, it is not straightforward for politicians to make a 
case for why, as elected representatives, they should act on climate change. 
However, politicians know that action is necessary, and so develop strategies 
for building support. Below, I discuss how researchers and practitioners could 
better use politicians’ knowledge and experience, and support them in 
developing stronger responses to the challenge of climate governance. 
 
5. Conclusion: The role of national politicians in global climate 
governance 
 
This conclusion begins with a consideration of the implications of this work for 
research. In particular, it discusses the role of phronetic social science in 
developing an understanding of the national politics of climate governance, 
stressing the importance of contextual accounts that acknowledge the 
motivations, assumptions and (lack of) power of actors within governance 
systems. It then responds to the current moment in climate politics, and 
suggests ways in which the learning from this study could be applied in order 
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to better support national politicians to respond to the global challenge of 
climate governance.  
 
5.1 The research challenge: Linking global governance to national 
political realities 
 
The results from this study indicate that there is a need to focus more 
attention on the ways in which global issues are experienced, shaped and 
implemented by decision-makers at the national level. There is a considerable 
gulf between the extent and reach of governance mechanisms proposed by 
advocates of ‘earth system governance’, ‘planetary stewardship’ and similar 
projects, on the one hand, and the more limited efforts of these politicians to 
craft a manageable and meaningful agenda for climate action, on the other.  
 
Rather than lingering on the subject of complex global challenges, the 
politicians in this study acknowledged the evidence, but then turned to what 
they perceived to be achievable actions. This may be a well-meaning attempt, 
even a tactical choice, to frame difficult issues in ways that are less 
threatening and more amenable to action: better to do something than nothing 
at all. The obvious drawback to this strategy is, of course, that the stability of 
earth systems is not a matter that can be negotiated away. How can research 
both explain this discrepancy, and suggest responses?  
 
The research presented here only considers politicians in one legislature. 
Members of the UK Parliament operate under the political traditions, 
constitutional and legislative particularities of the UK system. Given that no 
major economic powers currently have a national climate plan compatible with 
their Paris pledges (Climate Action Tracker 2019), it is reasonable to conclude 
that a commitment to far-reaching action is eluding most political groupings. 
However, the reasons for this may differ across different political systems.  
 
Comparative studies would reveal whether different political systems result in 
different strategies by individual politicians. For example, UK Members of 
Parliament are elected to represent a geographical constituency, which could 
explain their efforts to link the global issue of climate change to the needs of 
their local area. Strategies may well be different in a different political system, 
such as proportional representation based on a national list, as used in 
Scandinavia, for example; or in federal political systems like Germany or the 
US. Comparative research across different legislatures would confirm the 
extent to which the UK case is generalizable.  
 
 
This study illustrates the possibilities of phronetic research (Schram et al., 
2013) and its focus on developing a close understanding of people’s (in this 
case, politicians’) lived experience and innate understandings. If advocates 
from the scientific and research communities want politicians to make more 
significant efforts to address global challenges, they will need to work with 
them, drawing on their phronetic knowledge to understand the possibilities 
and constraints of their role. Such an approach would, in turn, allow all sides 
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to challenge their assumptions, and work together to develop the ambitious 
yet workable plans that are needed if climate goals are to be met.  
 
As Noel Castree and others have argued (Barry, 2012; Castree, 2017), doing 
this will require better interdisciplinary working, involving collaboration with 
critical social sciences and humanities scholars. The study presented here is 
one such example. Yet the working methods, language and publication habits 
of different disciplinary groupings can make such collaboration challenging.  
 
5.2 Implications for current climate politics 
 
The fieldwork reported in this paper concluded in spring 2018. Since then, as 
described at the start of this paper, there has been a remarkable upsurge of 
political attention on climate change. By September 2019, four countries – the 
UK, Norway, Sweden and France – had written a target of net-zero emissions 
into law, and fifteen others had non-binding net-zero targets, or were 
considering legislation (ECIU 2019). Meanwhile, four countries – the UK, 
France, Canada and Ireland – had declared a ‘climate emergency’, alongside 
hundreds of states, provinces and local authorities worldwide (Climate 
Emergency UK, 2019). 
 
A recent analysis of the Twitter activity of Members of the UK Parliament 
shows a sharp rise in mentions of climate, from an average of 1 mention per 
day, from the Twitter accounts of 577 MPs, up to 7.8 mentions per day in May 
2019, peaking with 160 tweets on 1 May, when the UK Parliament declared a 
climate emergency (Ebrey 2019). There have also been marked shifts 
observed in public opinion polling on climate (Barasi 2019). 
 
These rapid changes suggest that some of the issues facing the MPs I spoke 
to in 2016-18 are being addressed – particularly the concerns that 
interviewees had about speaking out on climate. As the research cited above 
shows, MPs now seem less inclined to tailor their message for fear of being 
seen as too extreme.  
 
So far, however, the new political focus on climate has been largely 
declarative, not substantive. This is not necessarily a criticism: it is too early to 
say whether radical action will follow radical targets and commitments. 
However, previous phronetic analyses would suggest that the success, or 
otherwise, of this new climate politics – in terms of its translation into action 
resulting in lower greenhouse gas emissions – will depend on the ability of 
different system actors to exert influence over the definitions both of the 
problem and the proposed solution. Griggs and Howarth’s (2012) study of the 
‘sustainable aviation’ debate uncovered a complex struggle to define and own 
this concept. There are now signs that similar struggles are afoot to define and 
own the concepts of ‘net zero’, and ‘climate emergency’.  
 
For example, the Scottish Government’s ‘Programme for Scotland’, published 
in September 2019, commits Scotland to a target of net zero emissions by 
2045, whilst continuing to support oil and gas exploration in the North Sea. 
Introducing a programme to reduce emissions from oil and gas extraction, 
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entitled the Net Zero Solution Centre, they make the bold claim that the North 
Sea will become “the first net zero hydrocarbon basin in the world” )Scottish 
Government 2019:50), distinctly at odds with protesters’ insistence that the 
only feasible path to net zero is to ‘keep it in the ground’. An analysis by 
Sophie Yeo of the actions of local governments who have declared a ‘climate 
emergency’ shows that, so far, the response has been to repurpose existing 
programmes, rather than reorientate overall aims and working practices in line 
with the ‘emergency’ (Yeo, forthcoming). In line with the of the study 
presented here, this suggests that politicians accept the need to act on climate, 
but feel that they have to shape action in ways which they believe to be 
manageable and appropriate. 
 
 5.3 Directions for research and practice 
 
The results from the study presented here suggest some fruitful areas for 
collaborative research and practice. First, discussions of agency could be 
reshaped to include a more explicit articulation of power relations and vested 
interests which may constrain politicians (Geels, 2014; Oreskes and Conway, 
2012; Phelan et al., 2012). The fossil-fuel divestment movement, now gaining 
considerable traction, is one example of this. Efforts to uncover and quantify 
public subsidies for carbon emissions, so-called fossil fuel subsidies, are 
another (Coady et al., 2017). Previous research indicates that climate policy 
becomes highly politicized once incumbent industries are challenged (Stokes 
and Breetz, 2018), so issues of power relations and associated political 
conflict are likely to increase over coming years.  
 
Second, some promising collaborations are emerging around proposals for 
democratic innovation, particularly deliberative processes which allow for 
dialogue between citizens and politicians, as well as other actors including 
scientists. Deliberative processes allow politicians and publics to debate the 
implications of climate change, and co-create responses (Dryzek, 2002).This 
approach has already been used in Ireland (The Citizens’ Assembly, 2018), as 
well as a number of local areas in the UK. In June 2020, the UK Parliament 
confirmed that they would hold a Citizens’ Assembly on climate change, to be 
run in early 2020.  
 
Last, there is a need to study and learn from existing and proposed political 
strategies for climate action, to investigate which climate strategies have built 
stronger democratic mandates for national and international action. For 
example, has the German Energiewende, or Energy Transition, with its focus 
on local action by citizens, social enterprises and municipalities, increased 
understanding of, and support for, significant climate action? Proposals by 
some US Democrats for a Green New Deal have undoubtedly raised the 
profile of climate in US politics; to what extent has this enabled politicians on 
the left to embed climate issues into their core political project?  
 
Given the magnitude of the climate governance challenge, researchers and 
advocates may well be tempted simply to raise the volume, placing further 
demands on national politicians to accept and implement their proposals, 
without acknowledging the limitations they face. The research presented here 
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shows, instead, the value of developing an understanding of the motivations, 
outlooks and knowledge of national politicians, to craft politically feasible 
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